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Executive summary 
As part of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS)-Programme for Land and Agrarian 
Studies (PLAAS) ‘Breaking New Ground’ project, a study was commissioned on Lake Chiuta 
between August 2004 and March 2005 to identify the major challenges of implementing co-
management in shared ecosystems. There are frequent conflicts among fishing communities on 
Lake Chiuta mainly due to definitions of resource boundaries and membership, the limited 
empowerment of the user communities because of weak decentralised structures, and the 
application of different policy frameworks and rules on the two sides of the lake. However, 
opportunities exist for co-operation as the fishing communities share the same culture, traditional 
values and language. They recognise the roles of their traditional leaders and both governments – of 
Malawi and Mozambique – have adopted community participation approach in their development 
projects. Both countries have also signed various international conventions, agreements, and 
protocols that deal with conservation and management of natural resources.  
The process of establishing Lake Chiuta transboundary fisheries co-management started in 2002, 
and still falls largely in Phase I. Both Malawian and Mozambican fishing communities need to 
continue to share information and ideas on how to develop a common management strategy to 
reduce conflicts. Further steps in Phase II include a formal agreement to be signed between the two 
parties and harmonisation of policy and legislative frameworks. The final stage, Phase III, will 
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1 Introduction 
Fisheries co-management initiatives have been implemented in various water bodies of southern 
Africa since the 1990s (Geheb & Sarch 2002). A Participatory Fisheries Management Programme 
(PFMP) was introduced on Lakes Malombe, Chilwa and Chiuta in Malawi between 1993 and 1995 
(Bell & Donda 1993; Hara & Banda 1997). In Zambia and Zimbabwe, the co-management 
arrangement has been implemented on Lake Kariba since mid-1990s (Hachongela et al. 1998; 
Malasha 2003), while Mozambique and South Africa are implementing the initiative in selected 
areas along the coast (Lopes et al. 1998; Sowman et al. 1998). Community participation in decision-
making processes regarding resource monitoring and control through formulation and enforcement 
of fisheries regulations is a key element in these initiatives. On the other hand, the state is involved 
in promulgation of a legislative framework and, in some cases, assists the user community to 
enforce the regulations.  
The initiation process of these co-management arrangements varies from place to place. In some 
areas, the state initiated the co-management regimes, while in others user communities started the 
process. Consequently, outcomes – like equitable access to resources and cost-effectiveness – also 
vary. 
Evaluation studies conducted on some small water bodies such as Lake Chiuta and Lake Kariba 
show that the user community has potential to contribute to sustainable resource management if 
enabling conditions are created. While most of the previous studies have centred on resource 
attributes, behavioural patterns and decision-making processes, very little work has focused on the 
implementation of co-management arrangements in shared water bodies, which is one of the 
complex factors (Knox & Meinzen-Dick 2001). There has been an emerging interest in 
transboundary natural resource management (TBNRM) initiatives since 1990, with some countries 
like South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, and Botswana already advanced in creating enabling 
conditions (Griffin et al. 1999). However, the approach has mainly been applied to wildlife and 
forestry sectors.  
It is against this background that this study was designed to identify some of the major challenges 
of implementing co-management in shared fishery ecosystems. Lessons will be drawn from Lake 
Chiuta, which is shared between Malawi and Mozambique.  
Objectives of the study 
The overall objective of this study is to identify challenges in implementing fisheries co-
management regime in the shared ecosystem of Lake Chiuta. Specifically the study aims to:  
• examine challenges of implementing a fisheries co-management regime on Lake Chiuta 
with specific reference to resource boundary and scale 
• identify constraints and opportunities of developing a transboundary co-management 
arrangement on Lake Chiuta at community level as a way of addressing conflicts.  
1 
Commons Southern Africa occasional paper; no. 9 
2 The area under study  
Lake Chiuta (Figure 1) is located at an altitude of 620m. It is shared between Malawi and 
Mozambique. The Malawi-Mozambique boundary is approximately 1 569km long (US Department 
of State 1971). The lake is shallow with a mean depth of 5m and has a total surface area of about 
200km2 of which 49km2 lie in Mozambique (FAO 1994).  
The lake has a number of inflowing rivers such as the Lifune, Chitundu and Mpili rivers. Depending 
on seasons, it is sometimes connected by a swampy channel to Lake Amaramba, from which flows 
the Lujenda River.  
Figure 1: Map of Lake Chiuta 
 
The fishery is predominantly artisanal with fishers operating either dugout or planked canoes for 
both subsistence and cash. The Department of Fisheries indicated in 1971 that it was not possible to 
carry out any fisheries work in this area due to its remote location (DoF 1971). Before 1970, annual 
fish production in Lake Chiuta was estimated at 200 tonnes. However, from 1976 to 2003, the 
annual fish landings (Malawian side only) has been around 1 500 metric tons (DoF 2003). The 
catches are dominated by Oreochromis shiranus (makumba), Tilapia rendalli (chilunguni), Clarias 
gariepinus (mlamba) and Barbus paludinosus (matemba). The main fishing gear include gillnets, 
fish traps and long lines. Seines are used only in the Mozambican waters.  
Background to fisheries management on Lake Chiuta 
Before the mid-1970s, the lake was under a similar management regime in both Malawian and 
Mozambican territories. Traditional authorities had powers to allow and allocate fishers on beaches. 
The fishing community recommended use of fish traps gillnets, long lines and gill nets (Dissi & 
Njaya 1995). However, due to abundance of the resource at that time, control of access was not 
necessary; rather, it was a way of demonstrating the powers of the local authorities:  
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According to Chief Chimwala [on western Lake Malombe], the power of the chief was over 
his people. He was their guardian, and they gave him/her gifts of food and other items in 
return for his guardianship. A portion1 of fish was always given to him as a token of 
appreciation  
(Chirwa 1997:65) 
The traditional authorities are based on a lineage system of indirect rule that was introduced in the 
1940s by the colonialists (Lopes et al. 1998; Nhantumbo et al. 2003). One of the main 
responsibilities allocated to the chiefs by the colonialists was the collection of taxes, fees and dues. 
By the 1970s, there was a shift towards a more centralised regime in Malawi when a catch data 
recording system was introduced on Lake Chiuta. By this time, there were less than five seines 
operating on the lake. By the mid-1990s, a co-management arrangement was introduced after the 
user community approached the Malawi Department of Fisheries (DoF) for support to evict over 
300 seine fishers who were operating on the lake. They also formed beach village committees 
(BVCs), which demanded a formal recognition of their fishing rules in 1997 (Njaya 2002).  
The chiefs in Mozambique have more powers to control access to fisheries on Lake Chiuta although 
there is one agricultural extension worker who is involved in fisheries work. Given these varied 
management regimes on the lake, there have been conflicts mainly due to the prohibition of seines 
on the Malawian side.  
3 
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3 Co-management and TBNRM: A review of concepts 
The emerging interest in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) initiatives 
lends weight to the argument for involving communities in TBNRM, not only to maintain 
ecological conditions, but also to facilitate dialogue between respective communities. In some 
areas, the TBNRM initiatives serve to reduce conflicts between the communities (SLSA Team 
2003). 
TBNRM is defined as ‘any process of collaboration across boundaries that increases the 
effectiveness of attaining natural resource management or biodiversity conservation goal(s)’ (van 
der Linde et al. 2001:10). The approach covers a wide continuum of activities ranging from 
transboundary co-management or CBNRM and transboundary community protected areas to large-
scale natural resource management integrated into regional economic development. It is now 
becoming a focus of new donor-funded projects in natural resource management (Katerere et al. 
2001; Wolmer 2003). The formal TBNRM initiatives are grouped into four categories. These 
include: transfrontier conservation areas like Maloti/ Drakensberg, which straddles the 300km-long 
border between Lesotho and South Africa; TRNRM areas like the ZIMOZA initiative, which 
involves Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia; regional authorities like the Zambezi River 
Authority and protocols and international conventions such as the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (MBERU 2002). 
There has always been traditional management of natural resource involving TBNRM – people 
have survived on farming, harvesting forestry products and aquatic resources (MBERU 2002). 
Previously, communities living near borders used the resources without any reference to the 
borders. In addition, communities could utilise resources that are now part of protected areas such 
as forestry, national parks and sanctuary areas.  
Community participation refers to an active involvement of individuals or groups in an activity 
(Campbell & Townsley 1996). If management is to succeed, fishers must support management 
efforts through formulation and enforcement of rules (Wilson et al. 1994). However, the degree of 
user group involvement may differ from one country to another (Jentoft & McCay 1995).  
The idea of active participation of local resource users and communities in development and 
management has been part of the development process in certain parts of the world since the 1960s 
(Pomeroy & Viswanathan 2003). Traditional and informal governance systems for fisheries have 
been practised historically in many African countries (WHAT 2000). The traditional leaders had 
authority to control access and fishing operations. However, these locally-based governance 
systems, which were important in developing countries, lost their effectiveness for various reasons. 
These include: lack of legal recognition; failure to cope with the introduction of modern fishing 
technologies; inability to exercise governance over the full range of fishery resources or gear types; 
lack of legitimacy or cohesion of community; and the inability to exclude or control new migrants 
(WHAT 2000). Despite these problems, arrangements at the community level are important 
building blocks for the effective management of fisheries.  
Co-management refers to an arrangement between a central authority and resource user groups (Sen 
& Nielsen 1996). The user groups have to be more actively involved in fisheries management if the 
regime is to be both effective and legitimate. Co-management requires a clear commitment on the 
part of government to the sharing of power and authority with local government and community 
organisations. A key function of co-management is for the state to use its authority and power to 
contain and channel fisheries conflicts (Wilson et al. 2003). 
A concern has been raised regarding the lack of democracy in co-management programmes that 
involve chiefs – consultations between fishers and chiefs may be very limited (Lowore & Lowore 
1999). Another criticism of co-management is that it is like a ‘fox guarding the hen house’ and that 
it allows for ‘free-riding’ by some do not contribute to co-management but reap the benefits realised 
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from investment by others (Jentoft et al. 1997). A further criticism is that the local community may 
abuse their rights as custodians of the fisheries.  
One of the most fundamental aspects of the implementation of common property regimes is 
definition of a boundary (Ostrom 1990; Knox & Meinzen-Dick 2001; Pinkerton 2003). Effective 
common property regimes are able to exclude outsiders. In situations where an elite group or 
politically powerful fishers attempt to access the resources, the local community should seek 
support from the government for protection of their rights or to institute sanctions to illegal fishers 
(Knox & Meinzen-Dick 2001). This occurred in the case of Lake Chiuta, where the local fishers 
sought support from the DoF to have their rules formally recognised. 
Decentralisation refers to any act in which a central government systematically and rationally 
transfers its powers, authority, and responsibility to local government structures or lower level 
institutions such as provinces or districts and community associations or user groups (Ribot 2002; 
Pomeroy & Viswanathan 2003). Democratic decentralisation reforms give an opportunity for a shift 
from project-based to legally-supported popular participation. As Ribot (2002) observes, such 
reforms demand necessary resources for scaling up these popular participation initiatives across 
national boundaries. Pomeroy and Viswanathan (2003) observe that, in many countries, government 
programmes and projects stress the formation of local organisations and their autonomy to handle 
some aspects of fisheries management. However, adequate attention is seldom given to the 
establishment of administrative and policy structures that define the legal status, rights, and 
authority essential for local organisations to perform effectively.  
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4 Lake Chiuta fisheries co-management: Implementation challenges  
Boundary and membership 
In terms of scale, this study refers to a community that includes fishers and traditional leaders. It 
also recognises that resource boundary and membership are key issues that are necessary for an 
effective co-management regime. Definition of a resource boundary is one of the keys to reducing 
conflicts and facilitating membership that may result in exclusion of some appropriators (Ostrom 
1990; Knox & Menzie-Dick 2001; Pinkerton 2003). In the case of Lake Chiuta, the physical 
features of the lake form the geographical boundary of the ecosystem and the political boundary is 
marked by beacons. Changes have been made over time to the Malawi-Mozambique border on 
Lake Chiuta (Box 1).  
Box 1: Boundary changes on Lake Chiuta between 1899 and 1954 
The 1 569km boundary sector between Beacon 1 (15o 5' 606.77", 35o49'36.74"E) on the left bank 
of the Malosa river and Beacon 17 on the shore of Lake Nyasa was initially demarcated [in] 1899 in 
accordance with the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 11, 1891. From Beacon 7F the boundary 
extends in a straight line to Beacon 8 forming a prolongation of the line previously delimited from 
Beacon 8 to Beacon 10. Thus, the boundary between Beacon 7F and 10, located at the south-east 
corner of Lake Chiuta, consists of a single straight line. In accordance with the 1911 rectification, 
the boundary from Beacon 10 followed the eastern shore of Lake Chiuta until it reached Beacon 11 
at the eastern edge of the marsh between Lake Chiuta and Lake Amaramba. Article 4 of the Anglo-
Portuguese Agreement of November 18, 1954, re-delimited the boundaries in Lake Chiuta between 
Beacons 10 and 11. [Therefore] the frontier on Lake Chiuta [is]… a straight line drawn from Beacon 
11 running due south to its intersection with the prolongation westwards of a line drawn along the 
geographical parallel of Beacon 10, as described in Exchange of Notes of May 6, 1920. 
Source: US Department of State (1971:5) 
The local Malawian fishers have their own version of the story as to how the boundary changed:  
In the past, a Portuguese named Katsabola arrived on the Mozambican side of Lake Chiuta. 
At that time the whole lake was within Malawi (then Nyasaland). He built a school and clinic, 
which could serve both Mozambicans and Malawians. Having procured a powered boat, he 
asked our Government if he could use it on the lake. He was positively granted that 
permission which necessitated re-alignment of the boundary into the lake  
(Mainala pers. comm.). 
The Mozambican fishers agree with this story: 
The position of the boundary was not where it is now. The boundary was within Mozambique, 
where chipilara (beacon) is, but after arrival of Katsabola the boundary was re-aligned into 
Lake Chiuta  
(Kalawire pers. comm.).  
This common understanding about the boundary re-alignment could be an issue on the shared lake 
although it was not highlighted during a meeting of both parties in 2002 (Annexes 1–3).2 The main 
issue is the lack of knowledge among the local community about the basis of such re-alignment of 
the boundary.  
In addition to boundary, membership is a recommended factor in implementation of common 
property regimes that govern management of smaller or medium water bodies (Pinkerton 2003; 
GTZ 2001). Lake Chiuta falls within the smaller-sized category although no specific size is given.  
On the Malawian side of Lake Chiuta, seine fishers are excluded. However, if a fisher operates gear 
like gillnets, long lines and fish traps then access is guaranteed (DoF 2002). On the other side, the 
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Mozambican fishers allow seining operations although there is a closed season from November to 
April.  
Membership may be understood differently informally – it may be based on where one comes from, 
for example which beach, village, traditional authority or district. Sometimes membership takes the 
form of gear ownership – gillnet, seine or fish trap. In some areas, a fisher is identified based on 
whether he or she is a resident or migrant. An additional category is membership of a beach village 
committee, as is the case on the Malawian side. Another form of defining membership is through 
licensing, although its implementation is mainly focused on revenue. In small-scale fisheries in 
Malawi, registration and licensing are essentially formalities. They are both required by law, but 
applicants who meet statutory requirements are not normally denied access to the fishery even if the 
water body is over-fished (Lowore & Lowore 1999). Rights of exclusion for Malawi’s fisheries are 
not well defined in this respect. Townsend and Wilson (1996:312) contend that ‘the problems of 
management of an open-access resource are caused by the absence of the right to control the 
resource’. However, as Lowore and Lowore (1999) note, the fishers on Lake Chiuta appear to 
display the strongest sense of resource ownership among the other smaller lakes.  
The decentralisation process in Malawi and Mozambique  
A decentralisation process in Malawi started in the mid-1990s. The devolved functions which affect 
fisheries include extension services, enforcement, and licensing of vessels and gear. Despite 
progress having being made towards the devolution of tasks to local district assemblies and user 
groups such as BVCs, there is still a long way to go. There is need for the formulation of by-laws 
for empowerment of the beach village committees. There is also need to fit these committees into 
decentralised structures such as village development committees, area development committees and 
district assemblies.  
In Mozambique, amendments to the Mozambican Constitution that promoted a regime based on 
democratic principles and multi-party politics were introduced in 1990. With regard to the 
decentralisation process, Nhantumbo et al. (2003:6) argue that this has not been implemented as 
expected:  
The granting of more autonomy to lower levels of government came to be seen as one of the 
avenues to improving the state’s capacity to deliver basic services and re-establish the 
legitimacy of government institutions at the local levels. The approach therefore follows the 
orthodox ‘bureaucratic decentralisation’ discourse. 
In both countries conflicts arise because parallel structures for development projects are often 
formed alongside the traditional ones. For example, where BVCs were formed, the process did not 
take into account the existing institutional arrangements and conflict resolution mechanisms.  
Policies on fisheries co-management 
Reviews of the fisheries policy and legislation were carried out between the 1990s to 2001. Malawi 
then put in place enabling conditions for the implementation of CBNRM (Box 2). However, 
implementation of the legal instruments has been slow mainly due to the lack of community 
empowerment, among other things.  
Nhantumbo et al. (2003:7) observe that CBNRM is still ‘evolving in Mozambique, in terms of 
approach and depth; therefore, a model best suited for conditions in the country has yet to be 
completed’. However, the Forestry and Wildlife Policy has the social objective of ensuring greater 
involvement of local communities in the management of natural resources and ensuring that they 
derive benefits from such resources. CBNRM is the strategy for realising this objective. A 
fundamental implementation framework for this strategy is outlined in the Land Law, which 
establishes that communities can have access to land delimitation process and acquisition of land 
use certificates.  
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Box 2: CBNRM policies in Malawi 
National Environment Policy of 1996: Following the National Environmental Action Plan that was 
launched in 1994, the National Environment Policy was developed to provide an overall framework 
against which relevant sectoral policies such as fisheries, forestry, wildlife, water and land can be 
reviewed to ensure they are consistent with sustainable development principles. Among others, the 
policy seeks to promote co-operation between government, local communities, women’s groups, 
non-governmental organisations and the private sector in the management and utilisation of the 
natural resources and the environment.  
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy of 2001: The policy represents an integrated policy 
framework for both fisheries and aquaculture in Malawi. The general policy goal is to maximise the 
sustainable yield from the national waters of Malawi and human-made water bodies through a 
participatory fisheries management approach. 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 25 of 1997: The Act came into force in 1997 after 
the proposed Fisheries Conservation and Management Bill was enacted in Parliament. Part III of 
the Act deals with local community participation. It also highlights the importance of signing a 
fisheries management agreement between the DoF and the Fisheries Management Authority. 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Rules of 2000: This document spells out fisheries 
rules and penalties. It also elaborates on duties of BVCs and outlines conditions of fisheries 
management, including the need for a management plan. 
Local Government Act 42 of 1998: The Act makes provision for district assemblies to take 
responsibility for management of forests, fisheries and wetland within a district, including the 
formulation and enforcement of by-laws relating to natural resource management. The traditional 
authorities are ex-officio members of the district assemblies. 
Mozambique’s Fisheries Law 3 of 1990 regulates the exploitation of fisheries resources (Box 3). 
Lopes et al. (1998) refer to the way that socio-political change since 1975 and the devastating civil 
war has affected the livelihoods of the fishers. After independence in 1975, management of fisheries 
resources was in the hands of the Administraçăo Maritima (Lopes et al. 1998). This organisation 
was responsible for resource monitoring and control of the artisanal fisheries sector. Then the 
management regime shifted from a community-based approach to a centralised approach in which 
the Fisheries Administration (Administraçăo Pequeira) controlled and managed the fisheries 
resource. However, the structural adjustment programme that Mozambique pursued since the 1980s 
led to restructuring of the institutional arrangement and the establishment of the Insituto de 
Investigaçăo Pesca de Pequena Escala, which aims at promoting small-scale fisheries 
development. Since 1993, there has been an interest in community participation. The main concern 
is that the government does not grant any official rights to fisher representatives; instead they are 
considered as the most efficient way to collect taxes.  
Box 3: Approved policies affecting the use of natural resources 
Land: Land Policy of 1995, Land Law 19 of 1997, Land regulations 66 of 1998 and Technical 
Appendix to the Land Law of 1999. 
Environment: Environmental Law 20 of 1997, Regulation for Environmental Impact Assessment 
76 of 1998. 
Forestry and Wildlife: Policy and Strategy for Development of Forestry and Wildlife 8 of 1997, 
Forestry and Wildlife Law 10 of 1999 and Forestry and Wildlife Regulations of 2002. 
Agriculture: Agrarian Policy of 1995, Agricultural Sector Investment Programme, with a Forest and 
Wildlife National Programme adopted in 1998 (including a component in support of government 
initiatives towards the implementation of CBNRM. 
Water: Water Policy 7of 1995. 
Fisheries: Fisheries Law 3 of 1990. 
Source: Nhantumbo et al. 2000:2 
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In response to global changes, in 1994 a further institutional change occurred when the mandate of 
managing fisheries resources was given to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAP). This 
sectoral difference could also contribute to how policies are formulated as it can be shown that 
Mozambique places much emphasis on the coastal resource management, as Serviços Provinciais 
de Administraçăo is the only branch that has field staff in all coastal districts and none in inland 
fisheries. It appears that Lake Chiuta is not a high priority in terms of relevant fisheries technical 
expertise since agricultural staff like those based at Mecanhelas are assigned this responsibility. 
Rules and regulations  
Two types of fisheries management systems exist in many fishing communities. The first is an 
informal management system, which is developed and implemented by a community of resource 
users and often coexists with a centralised fisheries management system. Outsiders to the 
community are often not aware of informal systems as these are not easily observed or understood. 
An informal management system refers to a ‘rights-and-rules system collectively sanctioned by 
fishers’ (Pido et al. 1996). Table 1 outlines the regulations for Lake Chiuta. 
Table 1: Fishing regulations for Lake Chiuta 
Rule/regulation Malawi Mozambique 
1. Permissible gear types:    
 (a) Gill nets Allowed Allowed 
 (b) Fish traps Allowed Allowed 
 (c) Long lines Allowed Allowed 
 (d) Beach seine Prohibited Allowed 
 (e) Open water seine (nkacha) Prohibited Allowed 
2. Minimum mesh size for gill nets was set at 69mm Allowed Not yet set 
3. Closed season for seines – 1 November to 30 April Not applicable as 
seines are prohibited 
Yes 
Based on the regulations, it is evident that the main source of conflict is with regard to seining 
operations. Seines are allowed on the Mozambican side, but they are prohibited on the Malawian 
side. There is need for continued dialogue between the two fishing communities to address this 
problem. 
9 
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5 A framework for transboundary natural resource management 
There are recommended steps to be considered when implementing a TBNRM arrangement (Knox 
& Meinzen-Dick 2001; van der Linde et al. 2001; Lanjouw et al. 2001). Lanjouw et al. outline three 
phases in adopting the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (Box 4) which are used in this 
study. 
Box 4: Phases of developing a TBNRM 
Phase I: Field-based co-ordination and collaboration: This phase focuses on harmonisation and 
co-ordination of management approaches, and development of field-based informal mechanisms 
for collaboration. These approaches and mechanisms respond to the objectives of transborder co-
operation. This phase emphasises regular communication between field staff and management 
staff of the ecosystem, sharing information on resource monitoring and joint planning and 
implementation of activities. 
Phase II: The existence and use of the harmonised approaches in the respective countries will 
facilitate the second phase of the strategy, which is formalisation of the transborder collaboration 
and harmonised policies. The second phase, however, is dependent on a minimal level of political 
support among the respective official governments. It is believed that improved management of the 
shared ecosystem is a function primarily of field-based collaboration, rather than official 
agreements.  
Phase III: A final phase could involve the signing of a formal agreement between or among the 
respective governments to establish a TBNRM area. The agreement should outline in its preamble 
the legislative background of the TBNM, define its purpose, describe the parties and the endorsing 
partners, and define the ecosystem area and its structures (a joint commission or other 
mechanism) and modes of operation.  
Source: Lanjouw et al. (2001:32) 
According to these phases of developing TBNRM, we can conclude that Lake Chiuta falls mostly in 
Phase I since most of the ongoing activities include consultations between the two parties as a way 
of reducing conflicts.  
Opportunities 
Several opportunities exist that could facilitate the introduction of the TBNRM arrangement on 
Lake Chiuta at a community level. These include socio-cultural issues, policy and political aspects, 
decentralisation, dependence on the resource and dialogue. 
Socio-cultural issues 
In terms of ethnicity, the majority of the people around the lake are Nyanja, Yao and Lomwe. They 
share a common history, language, socio-cultural values and traditions. Many practices such as land 
tenure systems, marriage traditions and initiation ceremonies are also common among the villagers 
around Lake Chiuta. The fact that many Malawians came from Mozambique and some of them 
have intermarried during the past decades bodes well for a common level of understanding on 
resource management between the two fishing communities. Griffin et al. (1999) assert that 
TBNRM facilitates the movement of people across borders for trading of fish and other 
commodities, which can strengthen cultural ties and traditions that might have been affected by 
political boundaries.  
Recognition of traditional powers by both Malawi and Mozambique offers an opportunity for a 
sustainable TBNRM framework that is built upon the ongoing CBNRM arrangements with 
incorporation of local knowledge. Hara and Nielsen (2003) contend that traditional structures in 
Africa play significant roles in terms of resource management as they serve as a link between the 
user community and the government. Traditional authority structures in southern Africa are 
considered a legacy of colonialism. In both countries, traditional authorities are based on a lineage 
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system of indirect rule that was introduced in the 1940s by the colonialists (Lopes et al. 1998; 
Nhantumbo et al. 2003). The main responsibilities of chiefs included collection of taxes, fees and 
dues as demanded by the Portuguese in Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique) and the British 
in Nyasaland (now Malawi). After independence many African countries maintained traditional 
authority structures but reviewed their duties, including control over their villages, settling disputes 
and allocating customary land. In Mozambique, their customary powers were revoked in early 
1990s, but recently the government has begun to recognise the role of traditional leaders.  
When fisheries co-management started in Malawi in 1993 there was little recognition of the roles of 
the traditional authorities in the regime. This created power struggles between the traditional 
authorities and BVCs which necessitated the incorporation of the authorities into the committees. 
The new structures were developed to be in line with the devolution process that recognises a 
cluster of community-based organisations and then village development councils, area development 
committees and district assemblies.  
While the historical boundary realignment may be a challenge, it could also present an opportunity 
in that both communities have the same understanding about resource boundary. Moreover, the 
boundary changes were made in a society that had the same traditional and customary values from 
time immemorial. 
Policy and political aspects 
Both Malawi and Mozambique are implementing co-management programmes in various water 
bodies. Natural resource policy reforms in Malawi began in the 1990s with emphasis on community 
participation mainly due to fiscal constraints and seeking ways of regulating access. In this context, 
recognition was given to environmental management as an essential element in sustainable 
economic development by establishing the Environmental Affairs Department in 1991. The 
National Environmental Action Plan was completed in 1994 following the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
The Government of Malawi approved the National Environmental Policy and the Environment 
Management Act (EMA) in 1996. Malawi’s National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy of 2000 and 
Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 27 of 1997 provide for participatory fisheries 
management and international co-operation in fisheries. These legal instruments create an enabling 
condition for a TBNRM framework. 
In Mozambique, the Fisheries Master Plan was approved by the Government in October 1994. The 
document outlines priorities and strategies for development to be pursued in subsequent years. In 
terms of small-scale fisheries, the plan emphasises the involvement of fishers in formulating and 
enforcing regulations (Lopes et al. 1998). The Regulamento de Pesca Maritima was formulated in 
1997, which facilitated the establishment of the Comissão de Administração Pesquerra. This 
committee is charged with the responsibility of advising MAP on resource management.  
In 1984, Malawi and Mozambique signed a Permanent Joint Commission on Cooperation, which 
can facilitate implementation of the proposed Lake Chiuta transboundary co-management. Both 
countries are also parties to various international conventions, agreements and protocols that deal 
with management of natural resources such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Of 
particular importance is the Southern African Development Community 2001 Protocol on Fisheries, 
which can legally facilitate introduction of the transboundary fisheries co-management. However, 
van der Linde et al. (2001) say, since establishing a TBNRM initiative may be a lengthy and 
difficult process, it may be necessary to start implementation before all the enabling conditions are 
in place. In support of this point, Lanjouw et al. state that ‘it is unrealistic to consider that a 
TBNRM area needs to be formally designated before regional collaboration can take place’ 
(2001:37). They assert that collaboration can take place at a lower political level since there are 
more preconditions for obtaining higher-level political support.  
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Decentralisation and co-management 
Like most African countries, Malawi and Mozambique are decentralising their authority in the 
management of natural resources. Since TBNRM requires democracy, Griffin et al. (1999) advocate 
that stakeholder involvement should occur at all stages of the process, particularly during decision-
making stages. In this context, a centralised approach to the formulation of the TBNRM 
arrangement is not recommended in Lake Chiuta. Rather, local fishing communities should 
participate actively at local level since in most cases they share the same culture and traditions.  
Dependence on the resource for economic gains 
Fish provides a livelihood to many people on both sides of Lake Chiuta. The growth of the urban 
centres of Mecanhelas in Mozambique and Liwonde in Malawi mean that fishing and fish trading 
are important sources of income for the majority of the population around the lake. Regulation 
remains a critical issue and is being pursued by both fishing communities and fisheries management 
authorities. Lake Chiuta lies in a remote area where alternative fish supply from other sources such 
as Lake Chilwa may not be reliable. Its stable fish supply ensures provision of much-needed 
nutrients and income to the villagers.  
Willingness to engage in dialogue 
In 2002 a meeting was organised for the two fishing communities and exchange visits continue 
between the district officials from both countries. This demonstrates the willingness of local 
communities to address and solve their problems and determine their future. It is expected that a 
TBNRM framework based on mutual understanding of the communities would be efficient as it 
involves building upon existing resource management systems and institutions (Griffin et al. 1999).  
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6 Conclusion 
This study has shown that there are several challenges and opportunities for CBNRM in shared 
ecosystems. In terms of scale, it is possible to develop a TBNRM with participation of the local 
community, although a minimum intervention of central governments may be required. This 
community-level process ensures active participation and understanding of necessary issues and 
policies affecting the resource users, thereby achieving a sustainable framework. What is even more 
interesting is the fact that the fishing community initiated the co-management regime on Lake 
Chiuta. As WHAT (2000) and Pomeroy and Viswanathan (2003) observe, the idea of active 
participation of local resource users and communities in development and management is not a new 
idea and has been part of the development process in many African countries.  
This study has also shown that resource users on the Malawian side of Lake Chiuta have capacity to 
exclude outsiders – mainly migrant seine fishers. The local fishers sought support from DoF to 
legally prohibit seines. This example supports the view of Knox and Meinzen-Dick (2001), who 
note that in some situations the local community can seek support from the government for 
protection of their rights.  
While it is important to define a resource (Ostrom 1990; Knox & Menzie-Dick 2001; Pinkerton 
2003), there are some challenges in situations where the boundary has been re-aligned without 
informing the local communities about the justification for this change, as is the case with Lake 
Chiuta.  
Finally, the process of establishing transboundary fisheries co-management that started in 2002 falls 
largely in Phase I according to the phases outlined by Lanjouw et al. (2001) (Box 4). Both fishing 
communities need to continue sharing information and ideas on how to co-operate and reduce 
conflict. It is also recommended that a management plan be drawn up to agree on specific measures 
governing exploitation of Lake Chiuta’s fish resources. A formal agreement will follow in Phase II 
in which harmonisation of policies will take place. Phase III will consolidate the whole process. 
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Annexure 1: Resource management issues for Lake Chiuta 
 
Issue Malawi Mozambique 
Conservation • Inadequate coverage of fisheries extension 
services  
• Use of illegal fishing gear  
• Weak enforcement  
• Closed season for seining from 1 November 
to 30 April  





• Fish traps  
• Hooks 
• Gill nets 
• Spears 
• Beach seines  
• Fish traps 
• Hooks  
• Gill nets 
Institutional 
framework 
• Department of Fisheries  
• Lake Chiuta Fisheries Association  
• Beach village committees  
• Police  
• Department of Agriculture 
• Traditional leaders 
Regulations • Use of recommended fishing gear – gill nets, 
fish traps and hooks  
• Minimum mesh size for gill nets is 2½ inches  
• Beach seines are prohibited 
• Catching of immature makumba (less than 4 
inches) is illegal 
• Use of poisonous substances to catch fish is 
not allowed 
• All gill nets have to be licensed 
• Use of beach seines is not allowed during 
closed seasons 
• Use of open water seines (nkacha) is 
prohibited 
• Offenders are apprehended 
• Observe international boundary on the lake 
Problems 
encountered and 
the causes of the 
problems 
• Use of illegal fishing gears (such as beach 
seines) 
• Illegal fishers carry firearms in order to 
threaten beach village committees 
• Lack of co-operation between BVCs and 
fishers 
• Threats from Mozambican counterparts 
• Cross-border fishing without proper 
permission 
• Use of illegal fishing gear (seines) 
• Limited closed season compliance 
• Lack of a common management strategy 
between Malawi and Mozambique 
• Confiscation of beach seines by Malawians 
in Mozambican waters 
• Lack of clear roles of the BVCs who appear 
to work for financial benefit rather than 
resource management 
• BVCs are cruel to offenders  
• Malawi’s traditional leaders delay in giving 
feedback to Mozambicans on confiscated 
nets 
Source: Njaya and Kazembe 2002 
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Annexure 2: Potential problems  
 
Issue Malawi Mozambique 
Conservation • Seining ban is still being violated 
• Local leaders are corrupt 
• No co-ordination between Malawi and 
Mozambique 
• No agreement on the closed season 
regulation 
Resource utilisation • Fishers violate seining ban • No respect for borders between the two 
countries 
• Use of prohibited nkacha seines 
Institutional set up • Limited co-operation between the 
association and BVCs  
• Local leaders, beach village committees 
and fishers are corrupt 
• Conflicts between beach village 
committees and seine fishers 
• Lack of co-ordination between Malawi 
and Mozambique 
• Delays in getting feedback from the 
Malawian local leaders 
• The Mozambicans have not been 
sensitised beforehand about the formation 
of BVCs 
• BVCs are cruel to offenders 
• BVCs are corrupt 
Regulations • Seine fishers continue to violate 
regulations 
• Lack of co-operation 
• Different management measures between 
Malawians and Mozambicans 
• No enforcement of closed season  
• Lack of co-operation between Malawian 
and Mozambican communities 
• Some seine operators enter Mozambique 
without proper immigration documents 
• Some seine fishers operate during closed 
season 
• Lack of patrol boats  
• Co-management in Malawi started without 
first sensitising the Mozambican local 
leaders 
Source: Njaya and Kazembe 2002 
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Annexure 3: Summary of problems and their causes 
 
Problem Cause 
• Seining ban is still being violated, resulting in 
conflicts between beach village committees and seine 
fishers 
• Use of prohibited nkacha seines 
• Local leaders, BVCs and fishers are corrupt 
• Migrating fishers pose some problems in resource 
management  
• Because alternative income-generating income 
activities are limited, people resort to using illegal 
fishing gear to catch more fish  
• No co-ordination of management measures between 
Malawi and Mozambique 
• BVCs confiscate Mozambican fishers’ seine nets even 
when they are operating in Mozambican waters 
• Delays in getting feedback from the Malawian local 
leaders 
• Committees are cruel in their operations 
• Different regulations on both sides of the lake 
• Use of nkacha (open water seines) on the lake leads to 
the damage of other fishers gears (that is, set gill nets)  
  
Source: Njaya and Kazembe 2002 
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Annexure 4: List of interviewees 
 
Mozambique 
• D Aliki 
• VH Kalawire 
• Willie Minjolo 
• R Nteuka 
 
Malawi 
• M Mainala 
• VH Chikumba 
• James Wisiki 
• N Massi 
• N Chikwembeya 
• K Mpalume 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 This portion of fish (thini la mfumu) is locally known as mawe, as described by Hara et al. (2002). 
2 The First Lake Chiuta Common Management Development Strategy workshop held in August 2002.  
 
